Manassas Junction and Bull Run were the almost unknown names of a little town and nearby creek on the morning of July 21, 1861. By evening on that fateful Sunday, both names were on their way to history books.

Across the pastoral rolling hills a mile or so apart was mostly wooded land, dotted with some cleared acreage. Scattered about the area as well were a number of houses of varying size and construction. Only a few hundred yards separated the two homes located on the brow of Henry Hill. Near those homes some six miles distant from the railroad junction of the Manassas Gap lines and the Orange and Alexandria and overlooking the meandering rill called Bull Run is where the major portion of the battle was waged.

Federal troops began marching out of Washington on July 16 following the special session held on July 4 by the Federal Congress. Clad in a vast mixture of uniforms -- blue, grey, brown, green -- and led by 43 year old Irvin McDowell with only two months under his belt as Brigadier, the 30,000 troops were mostly ill equipped, untrained and quite eager for battle.

At Richmond Robert E Lee, recently resigned from the United States Army in order to defend his beloved Virginia, served as adviser to Confederate President Jefferson Davis. May 8 found four Confederate companies stationed at Manassas Junction. Led by Brigadier Gen'l (West Point) Phillip St. George Cocke, the force of infantry and cavalry was soon increased to a dozen companies.

On June 1, when Brigadier Gen'l M. L. Bonham, former US Congressman and Mexican War veteran, arrived with a brigade, Brigadier Gen'l (West Point) Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard had been appointed commander of all Confederate forces in northeastern Virginia. Beauregard, who had been the superintendent of the Military Academy until only a few months previous was also a veteran of the Mexican War. The Gen'l quickly began to plan an offensive.

By July 14, Beauregard sent his plan to Richmond via South Carolina lawyer Col. James Chesnut who had served with President Davis in the United States Senate. Gen'l Johnston (West Point) was to leave from 3,000 to 5,000 men in the passes of the Blue Ridge Mountains where he had been facing the 18,000 troops under Brevet Brigadier Gen'l (Pennsylvania militia) Robert Patterson. The balance of Johnston's army was to move via the Manassas Gap Railroad to join forces with Beauregard. The pair were to advance upon Fairfax Court House, establish themselves between the lines of Union troops and attack separately. Johnston and Beauregard were then to attack and destroy Patterson at Winchester or wherever he might be.

Beauregard's plan never materialized. On July 16, the vanguard of the Federal army set out from Washington. Commanding the 1st division was an authority on artillery, West Pointer Brigadier Gen'l Daniel Tyler. 2d Division was led by Col. David Hunter (West Point), 3rd Division by Col. Samuel Heintzelman (West Point), 4th Division by militia Brigadier Gen'l Theodore Runyon, who was stationed seven miles from the battle area to guard communications, and 5th Division by West Pointer Col. Dixon Miles.

By nightfall most of the Federals had reached Annandale, some 10 miles to the west, and went into camp. Gen'l Beauregard's pickets had followed their movements. On July 17, the Federals moved on to Fairfax Courthouse, 10 miles further from Washington, where they began to meet the Confederates. The initial meeting found the Southern men rushing away, leaving behind forage and camp equipment. Marching four abreast the Yankees paraded through the town.

Confederate troops lay along an 8 mile stretch of Bull Run, with most of the men concentrated near seven crossing points. Reserve units were held in supporting distance. The crossing points were:

• Union Mills Ford: 3 Regiments of infantry with 4 12-pounder howitzers and 3 companies of cavalry under Col. Richard Ewell.
• McLean's Ford: 3 Regiments, 2 brass 6-pounders and one company of cavalry commanded by Brigadier Gen'l D. R. Jones (West Point).
• Blackburn's Ford: 3 Regiments and 2 6-pounders under Brigadier Gen'l James Longstreet (West Point).
• Mitchell's Ford in the center: 4 Regiments, two batteries of artillery, and 6 companies of cavalry commanded by Gen'l Bonham.
• Ball's and Lewis' Fords: 3 miles distant to the west near Stone Bridge, 3 Regiments, one battery, and one company of cavalry commanded by Gen'l Cocke.
• Stone Bridge: one Regiment and a battalion of infantry, 4 6-pounder guns and two companies of cavalry led by Col. Nathan Evans (West Point)
.

During the 17th, Beauregard made first military use of telegraph when he sent a message reading:

The enemy has assaulted my outposts in heavy force. I have fallen back on the Bull Run and will make a stand at Mitchell's Ford. If his force is overwhelming I shall retire to the Rappahannock Railroad Bridge saving my command for defense there and future operations.
Please inform Johnston of this, via Stauton, and also Holmes. Send forward any reinforcements at the earliest possible instant and to every possible means.

Johnston acted immediately upon receipt of another telegram; he set about an evasive movement, provided for his sick at Winchester, and began moving his army through Ashby's Gap toward Piedmont and a station on the Manassas Gap line.

McDowell had been assured by Winfield Scott that Patterson would prevent Johnston from reinforcing Beauregard. The 4th Brigade of Tyler's division moved into Centreville, found no enemy, and then proceeded toward Manassas.

A small skirmish ensued when Tyler went forward to make a reconnaissance. Tyler continued his advance when the Southern line came alive "with volleys which showed that the whole bottom was filled with troops." Tyler withdrew satisfied that the enemy was in force. The orderly withdrawal Tyler planned fell apart when some of the men panicked. A Regiment of New Yorkers ran a mile and half before they could be rallied.

The action had begun about noon and continued until 4 in the afternoon. There were casualties on both sides. McDowell's original plan was to make a sweep to the left of Masassas Junction from Fairfax Court House and Centreville to Fairfax Station then to Wolf Run Shoals. However a survey of the terrain had convinced him that the plan was unsound. Therefore, he would move right, turning the enemy's left. Their advance was then to be along Warrenton turnpike out of Centreville rather than the road toward Blackburn's Ford.

McDowell felt he had plenty of time; provision trains had just arrived, and his men were to be allowed a day to cook provisions for the march. The 19th was spent in contemplating the best way to move around the Confederate left.

A ford listed on maps as "Sudley Springs" located some three miles above the Stone Bridge was found to be passable. Nearby was said to be a good, but little used farm road. Reconnaissance located the narrow trace of roadway, however so many Confederates were in the area that further reconnoiter was impossible.

Beauregard in Manassas was as in the dark as were the Federals. He had not heard anything yet from General Johnston. Gen'l Beauregard was determined to take the offensive should Gen'l Johnston arrive in time.

July 20 was a busy day in the old village of Centreville. Troops appeared to be everywhere. The bivouacs of Federal troops swarmed with curious visitors despite the fact of their being very near to being within Confederate cannon range. Many of the non-military had come out from Washington in carriages. Women had brought dresses to wear at the dance to be held at Fairfax Court House following the expected rout of the Southern men.

One observer stated that it had "the appearance of a monster military picnic." Campfires burned everywhere on the 20th. Soldiers were cooking rations sent out from Washington. Daily ration was set at a small quantity of salt, 24 ounces of sugar, an ounce and half of coffee, 3/4 of a pound of pork or bacon or a pound and a quarter of fresh or salt beef, and a pound of hardtack. The men had been told to have 3 days ration in their haversacks.

McDowell had been convinced following the affair at Blackburn's Ford that the Confederate position was too strong, and he had made up his mind that a swing must be made to the right along the Warrenton turnpike. The Stone Bridge was defended by a battery and fortified with heavy abatis*. McDowell decided that he would avoid the bridge by making a feint and moving most of his troops across Bull Run at Sudley Springs.

McDowell's brigade commanders were to advance at 2:30 AM, 5th Division along with 4th Brigade, 1st Division, commanded by Col. Richardson, were to remain behind to guard Blackburn's Ford. As quickly as cannon fire was heard upstream Richardson was to open with his guns as a means of diversion.

Troubling McDowell was his worry that the men's rations would be insufficient along with the fact that many of his troopers terms of service had begun to expire. In particular the 4th Pennsylvania and the 8th New York Militia enlistment had ended. The Regiments turned a deaf ear to pleas to stay for a few days longer and planned to move to the rear the following morning.

At Manassas Junction during the 20th, the Confederates were heartened with the arrival of the vanguard from Shenandoah Valley. The 7th and 8th Georgia Regiments along with the 1st Brigade led by Brigadier Gen'l Thomas J Jackson arrived first. A train carrying Gen'l Johnston and the Alabama and Mississippi troops led by Brigadier Gen'l Barnard Bee arrived about noon. This was the first time steam propelled locomotives had been used for the speedy deployment of troops.

Johnston had been assured by the president of the rail road line that the last of his troops would be arriving during the day. His artillery and cavalry were coming along the turnpike. He had eluded Patterson with no problem.

Johnston immediately rode out to look over the field; he was dismayed to find Beauregard's position was extensive and the ground so densely wooded that he knew he would have to rely upon Beauregard's information. There was no way to reconnoiter in the time Johnston felt he had before the battle.

Johnston was bringing in 8,340 troopers and 20 guns. Gen'l Holmes was already in place with his 1,265 troops and a 6 gun battery from Aquia. Holmes along with Gen'l Jubal Early would be placed to the right of the fords as reserve. The balance of the reinforcements would be stationed to strengthen the center and left.

The Federal camp received little sleep during the night of the 20th. The men, untrained and unaccustomed to the physical effort involved in marching from Washington, were fatigued. Their feet were blistered and sore. Their heavy wool uniforms were not suited to the mid-July weather in Virginia, and they suffered mightily from the heat.

Artillery was ready on schedule, but the infantry was not. There was nearly an hour of waiting before Tyler's division set out for the road. Three of his brigades were to go straight along the turnpike toward Stone Bridge. They were to clear the turnoff point beyond Cub Run in order that Hunter's and Heintzelman's division could advance right and cross Sudley Ford by 7 AM. The distance was only about 2 miles to the turnoff, however it took hours to cross the distance.

The soldiers knew nothing of battle. They sang and joked in the darkness. The press and vocal element who were exempt from military service had assured them that the Confederates would be easily defeated. The marchers gleefully broke ranks to pick blackberries along their route. The 30 pounder Parrott attached to Tyler's division was an added problem. The gun's 19-horse team had enormous problems moving along the narrow, rough road.

The gun was to open the firing at Stone Bridge and had clearance for the advance. Choking dust added to the movement problems. When the gun finally arrived at Cub Run, a new problem surfaced: the men in charge worried that the gun was too heavy for the suspension bridge. The progress of Tyler's division took so long that Hewintzelman's and Hunter's columns took nearly three hours to cross the distance a fast-walking man normally covered in less than 30 minutes.

The road toward Sudley was reached long past the scheduled hour of 4 AM, and it was then that the troops realized the next distance was much longer than they had been told. According to McDowell's report Gen'l Tyler's artillery finally began firing at 6:30 AM. Nearly as quickly as the first three shots had been fired Richardson's guns opened at Blackburn's Ford. The Federal movement put the Confederates on the defensive.

"In my opinion," wrote Beauregard later, "the most effective method of relieving that flank (his weak left) was by a rapid, determined attack with my right wing and center on the enemy's flank and rear at Centreville, with due precautions against the advance of his reserve from the direction of Washington. By such a movement i confidently expected to achieve a complete victory for my country by 12 noon."

Beauregard ordered Jackson's brigade to take up position along Bull Run.

A peculiar absence of firing ensued as the Federals set out for Sudley Ford. The tower on Signal Hill noted the movement and wigwagged the message to Evans, who set out with 1,100 men and two 6-pounder howitzers across the valley of Young's Branch. Reaching high ground on a knoll above Stone House, about 400 yards to the rear of the home of the Carter family, Evans formed a battle line at right angles to his former position. A howitzer was placed at each end of the line.

When McDowell reached Sudley Ford, he found that a part of Bunside's brigade had crossed, but the men following were slow in getting across. Picnickers had accompanied the column and engaged the soldiers in chatter. Sudley Church lawn was filled with a crowd of worshippers. The message would not be given; the church would later be used as a field hospital. Burnside's men were hot and thirsty; they stopped to drink and refill their canteens. Union commanders urged their men forward. At last Burnside's men finally moved along toward Matthews' Hill. Evans' troops were ordered to fire as soon as the enemy appeared. Firing began at 9:15 AM.

Burnside threw forward skirmishers as he brought his troops out of the woods into the open fields. The 2nd Rhode Island with its battery of six 13-pounder rifled guns moved into place. For about an hour, Evans maintained his position on Matthews' Hill.

More Federal artillery was crossing at Suley and pushing into battle. Burnside approached McDowell; said his brigade was out of ammunition and had already borne the brunt of the battle. McDowell gave permission, and Burnside withdrew. His men stacked arms and took no further part in the battle.

Gen'l Bee, S.C., moved his column closer to Stone Bridge and brought it to Henry Hill where they could see Evans's troops fighting in the distance. Imboden's batteries were able to begin throwing shells upon the oncoming Union troops. When Evans continued his fight at Matthews house, Bee moved forward with the 7th and 8th Georgia, 4th Alabama, 2d Mississippi, 2 companies of 11th Mississippi, and Imboden's battery.

From his vantage point near Mitchell's Ford Gen'l Johnston, waiting with Gen'l Beauregard, became convinced that a major battle was underway. Orders were sent to Gen'l Holmes and Col. Early to move to the scene of battle. Gen'ls Bonham, Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet were instructed to begin demonstration along their fronts.

As noonday commenced the Confederates with Gen'l Bee in over-all command fell back. The demoralized Confederates retreated across Young's Branch and back toward Henry Hill where Gen'l Jackson and his brigade were waiting. Bee reached the brow of the hill where the home of a bedridden widow, Judith Carter Henry stood. Mrs. Henry lay in the "safety" of her bedroom. A few yards away stood the home of a free Negro man, James Robinson.

Bee reached the top of the hill and noticed Jackson sitting calmly and that is when Gen'l Bee shouted his familiar line, "Look! There stands Jackson like a stone wall! Rally round the Virginians!" The retreating Confederates took the shout to heart and began to form a solid line. To the right, Hampton's Legion, 600 strong had just arrived by train from Richmond and instantly joined the battle.

Near noon, Johnston and Beauregard approached Henry Hill. Fighting continued until, for some unexplained reason, a lull settled over the area between 1 and 2 o'clock. Troops continued moving into place, but firing almost completely ceased. Moving into line were Union troops - Willcox's brigade. Some 1,700 Confederates just off the train and led by Brigadier Gen'l Kirby Smith, math professor at West Point shortly before, bolstered the Southern line.

When McDowell's line again began to advance, Willcox was on the right, Porter and Franklin in the center, and Sherman on the left. Fighting commenced steadily all along the front, and by 2 PM the scene was bedlam.

Before 1 o'clock the Confederates had been retreating, but now they stood firm. Bee's, Bartow's, and Evans's commands merged with Jackson's brigade of fresh troops providing a force of 6,500 men, 13 pieces of artillery, and Stuart's cavalry.

McDowell sent Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries across Sudley Road and up Henry Hill. The Union guns soon became engaged with those of Imboden's and other Confederate batteries. Confederate snipers began firing at Rickett's and Griffin's batteries from Henry house or from cover of it. Some of the Union guns were turned upon the structure. Inside, the elderly Judith Henry was struck by five fragments, and she died before dusk.

The Confederate fire concentrated upon the two batteries. Stuart's 1st Virginia Cavalry charged down upon the Zouaves protecting the Union guns and routed them. Jackson's 33rd Virgiia mounted the rise on Griffin's right. As the Union Parrotts prepared to open upon them with canister Maj. William Barry, Chief of Artillery, mistakenly assured Griffin that this was the Regiment sent to their support by Heintzelman. The Southerners came to within 60 or 70 yards before delivering a deadly volley. 104 horses and 54 officers and men were killed or wounded. This would not be the only time the mish mash of uniforms worn on both sides caused confusion.

The 11 guns of Griffins's and Ricketts's batteries were put out of action for a time. They were regained with a countercharge.

Five assaults were made by the Federals. Each time the Confederates were driven from the plateau, they regrouped and came right back. Beauregard led some of the charges himself. Kirby Smith arrived at 3 PM with the hoped-for Confederate reinforcements. By 3:30, the heat was oppressive on the sun baked hilltop. The Union troops formed a crescent-shaped line covering three sides of the plateau. The Confederates stood firm, and up came the reinforcements.

The final assault came at 4 o'clock. Beauregard sensed victory and did his best to encourage his men into a frenzy of resistance. The "Rebel Yell" rang out all along the line of battle.

The two armies surged forward, and the balance of power shifted to the Confederates. Beauregard wrote, "Under this combined attack, the enemy soon was forced first over the narrow plateau in the southern angle made by the two roads so often mentioned into a patch of woods on its western slope then back over Young's Branch... The rout had become general and complete."

This article was written following years of research into the period of the 1860s. I've read books and documents from the National Archives, and I've talked to others including daughters and grand-daughters of the men who fought during that period. My family members fought on both sides of this dreadful war.

* Abatis: A means of defense formed by felled trees, the ends of whose branches are sharpened and directed outwards, or against the enemy. (Webster's 1913 Unabridged Dictionary)